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Applying these factors, we agree with the district court that Coleman's trial testimony was sufficiently voluntary. By the time Coleman testified at trial in , approximately two years had passed since his illegal interrogation in With this passage of time, the physically and psychologically coercive atmosphere of the interrogation had certainly dissipated.

See Mattison , F. In addition, by the time of trial, Coleman was represented by counsel, who had negotiated Coleman's grant of immunity in Williams's case in exchange for Coleman's testimony against Williams. Dupnik , F. The record does not indicate that Coleman's attorney objected to coercive practices by the state at trial or in the negotiations regarding Coleman's immunity. There is also no evidence that the admission of Coleman's trial testimony deprived Williams of a fair trial in violation of due process. Williams does not allege that Coleman's trial testimony was false, or that the state at any time instructed Coleman in how to inculpate Williams or in what to say on the witness stand.

Williams did not lack the opportunity at trial to test the voluntariness and veracity of Coleman's testimony through cross-examination. According to Coleman's declaration, Williams knew that the police had beaten Coleman at the city jail. Thus, defense counsel might have cross-examined Coleman about the coercive police tactics employed at his interrogation.

Coleman did disclose at trial the grant of immunity that he had received in exchange for his trial testimony, and defense counsel questioned him on the subject. The jury was therefore free to draw inferences regarding Coleman's credibility and motivations for testifying from the fact that he had entered into this bargain with the state.

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Finally, the fact that Coleman had counsel at Williams's trial provided some safeguard for the truth of Coleman's trial testimony. Because Williams's argument regarding Coleman's trial testimony is essentially indistinguishable from that raised in Mattison , our decision in that case compels us to deny Williams's claim.

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Williams has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Coleman's trial testimony was involuntary and that its admission rendered Williams's trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. Williams argues that the prosecution's failure to disclose material evidence impeaching the credibility of two key government witnesses violated his right to due process. In particular, Williams claims that the prosecution suppressed, and failed to correct false testimony regarding, a deal whereby the state procured the testimony of James Garrett in exchange for leniency in sentencing in an unrelated criminal case pending against Garrett.

Williams asserts that the district court erred in granting the state's summary judgment motion on these claims, see Williams III , 48 F. Due process requires that the prosecution disclose to the defense evidence that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. Agurs , U.

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Maryland , U. The prosecution must turn over evidence impeaching its witnesses, Silva , F. Bagley , U. Trombetta , U. Evidence is material when there is "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The prosecution must disclose to the defense a government agreement with a witness that may motivate the witness to testify and that may affect the outcome of trial. Giglio v.

To prevail on his claim, Williams must first demonstrate the existence of an agreement whereby the state offered James Garrett leniency in sentencing in the criminal case pending against him in exchange for his testimony against Williams.

Calderon , 52 F. The facts and circumstances that Williams alleges show only that James Garrett testified against Williams in the hope that his testimony would result in a reduced sentence in the criminal case against him. Williams's factual allegations are not sufficient to entitle him to habeas corpus relief because they do not establish the existence of the asserted agreement between the state and Garrett. See Williams , 52 F. Zant , 22 F. Accordingly, we do not remand for an evidentiary hearing because the district court properly granted summary judgment on Williams's claim that the state unconstitutionally suppressed its deal with James Garrett.

The prosecution has a duty to turn over to the defense all exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment, including evidence affecting the credibility of witnesses whose testimony may be determinative of the trial outcome.

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Giglio , U. Williams argues that the prosecution violated its duty by suppressing two tape recordings, one made in and the other in , that undermine the credibility of Oglesby's trial testimony. Williams contends that the tape recording of a telephone conversation between Oglesby and prison inmate Leslie White shows them conspiring to fabricate testimony in an unrelated murder case.

However, the California Supreme Court found otherwise. After an evidentiary hearing conducted in conjunction with Williams's third state habeas corpus petition, the referee appointed by the California Supreme Court found that Lieutenant Fitzgerald, a member of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Office, made the tape recording at the request of Oglesby, who did not want to become entangled in White's purported scheme to escape from jail. Williams II , 29 Cal. White's scheme was to implicate Oglesby in a crime in Ventura so that White, who was in custody in Los Angeles, could be transferred to Ventura to testify against Oglesby and attempt to escape from the Ventura jail.

Because we must defer to the California Supreme Court's factual findings on the tape recording, see 28 U. See Giglio , U.

Accordingly, the prosecution's failure to disclose the tape recording to the defense did not violate due process. Williams also alleges that the prosecution improperly suppressed a tape recording of an interview between White and investigators for the Los Angeles district attorney's office, in which White asserts that Oglesby committed perjury when he testified in another, unrelated criminal case.

See Bagley , U. Had the defense used the tape recording to undermine Oglesby's credibility, this evidence would have been merely cumulative of other evidence that the defense presented to impeach Oglesby. At trial, the defense effectively called into question the truthfulness of Oglesby's testimony through cross-examination. The defense elicited from Oglesby testimony showing, inter alia , that 1 he was an admitted murderer and accused rapist, 2 his plea agreement with the state drastically reduced his possible sentence on the charges against him, 3 he believed that his prior testimony for the state in an unrelated murder case would benefit him at sentencing, 4 he hoped to benefit further from his testimony against Williams, 5 he was a reputed "snitch," and 6 other inmates fed him fabricated information so that he would go to the authorities with it.

In light of this evidence presented, the district court correctly determined that the tape recording "would not have cast [Oglesby] in a significantly worse light. Because there exists no "reasonable probability that, had [the tape recording] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different," Bagley , U. In his state post-conviction proceedings, Williams argued that the trial court's admission of Oglesby's testimony violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because Oglesby was a government agent who deliberately elicited incriminating information from Williams in contravention of United States v.

Henry , U.

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After two state evidentiary hearings on this claim, the California Supreme Court found that Oglesby did not act as a government agent prior to May 21, , when Oglesby first informed law enforcement authorities about Williams's confession of criminal conduct and escape plans. The California Supreme Court then concluded that any impropriety in admitting evidence that Oglesby obtained from Williams after May 21, was harmless error because this post-May 21, evidence was cumulative of the evidence lawfully acquired before May 21, See Williams II , 29 Cal. The district court denied this claim on summary judgment, deferring to the California Supreme Court's factual findings and affirming its harmless-error analysis.

On appeal, Williams argues only that the two state evidentiary hearings on the factual issue of Oglesby's status as a government agent were not full and fair, and that the district court therefore improperly deferred to the California Supreme Court's factual findings. Williams claims that the state hearings were not full and fair because 1 the prosecution suppressed material, exculpatory evidence at the first hearing, and 2 the prosecution and the state referee conducting the hearings refused to grant Williams's witnesses use immunity to testify at the second hearing, and these witnesses declined to testify, invoking their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.

Williams's first argument is without merit because at the second state hearing he presented the evidence that he claims the prosecution improperly suppressed. The second hearing therefore cured any inadequacy of the first due to the unavailability of the evidence that Williams identifies. Thus, we cannot conclude that any failure by the prosecution to disclose this evidence denied Williams a full, fair, and adequate hearing in state court. With respect to Williams's second argument, we note that the prosecution's refusal to grant use immunity to a defense witness denies the defendant a fair trial only when 1 the witness's testimony would have been relevant, and 2 the prosecution refused to grant the witness use immunity with the deliberate intention of distorting the fact-finding process.

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To demonstrate the prosecutorial misconduct of the second prong, Williams must show that the prosecution intentionally caused a defense witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or that the prosecution granted immunity to a government witness in order to obtain that witness's testimony, but denied immunity to a defense witness whose testimony would have directly contradicted that of the government witness.

Duran , F. We will assume that Williams satisfies the "minimal requirement" that his witnesses' testimony would have been relevant to his Sixth Amendment claim. Whitehead , F. On the tape recording, White asserted that the Los Angeles police and district attorney's office engaged in illegal tactics to bolster weak prosecution cases. According to White, certain members of the police department and district attorney's office placed jail-house informants, like White and Oglesby, in cells near a defendant's cell and encouraged them to obtain incriminating information from the defendant.

If the defendant did not make any inculpatory statements, White alleged that the police officers or prosecutors forced the jailhouse informants to fabricate a confession of criminal conduct by the defendant. In the declaration, White claimed that Oglesby, at the behest of the police, fabricated his testimony regarding Williams's admission of responsibility for the Brookhaven Motel murders and robbery and regarding Williams's escape plans.

Before the California Supreme Court, Williams also contended that witnesses Ferril Mickens, Larry Montez, and Steven Cisneros would have testified generally about jailhouse-informant practices and specifically about Oglesby's practices. Turning to the prosecutorial misconduct required under the second prong, we note that Williams does not contend that the prosecution granted immunity to its witnesses, while denying immunity to his witnesses, and nothing in the record supports an argument that the prosecution attempted to distort the fact-finding process in this manner.

Thus, resolution of the second prong turns on whether the prosecution took affirmative steps to prevent Williams's witnesses from testifying. In deciding this matter, we rely upon the California Supreme Court's factual findings, which Williams does not contest, regarding his witnesses' refusals to testify.

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Two days before the rescheduled evidentiary hearing was set to begin, Leslie White was indicted and arrested for providing perjured testimony in past cases. One week later, after Williams called White as a witness, White asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and declined to testify. When called to the stand, Ferril Mickens, Larry Montez, and Steven Cisneros also invoked their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and refused to testify.

Williams's counsel had subpoenaed these three witnesses, but failed to secure protective orders for their transportation and housing during the evidentiary hearing. Mickens did not testify primarily because Williams and his counsel intimidated Mickens. Mickens feared that his testimony might result in bodily harm to himself or his family members. Montez declined to testify because he believed that his testimony would incriminate him and felt intimidated by Williams. Cisneros invoked his Fifth Amendment right for two reasons.

First, given White's indictment, Cisneros feared that he might be indicted for perjury if he provided testimony helpful to Williams. Second, Cisneros feared for his safety during transportation and housing in the Los Angeles County jail system. Based upon these factual findings and other evidence in the record, we conclude that the prosecution did not improperly cause Williams's witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.

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  6. Undue prosecutorial interference in a defense witness's decision to testify arises when the prosecution intimidates or harasses the witness to discourage the witness from testifying, for example, by threatening the witness with prosecution for perjury or other offenses. Angiulo , F. Morrison , F. The prosecution's conduct must amount to a substantial interference with the defense witness's free and unhampered determination to testify before the conduct violates the defendant's right to due process. Emuegbunam , F.